Configuration Manager OSD, Recovery Partitions and MBR2GPT

As I was preparing for my Midwest Management Summit 2017 session, Building the Ultimate Windows 10 UEFI Task Sequence, I did a full end-to-end run of the In-place Upgrade Task Sequence and started running into issues. This led me to discover a couple of issues around Configuration Manager (specifically the Format and Partition Disk step) and Windows 10 Recovery partitions. The version of this Task Sequence flips the machine from BIOS to UEFI using the new MBR2GPT utility. The high-level process goes something like this:
1. Deploy TS to current OS (can be Win7/8/8.1/10) running in Legacy BIOS mode
2. In-place Upgrade to Windows 10 (still in Legacy BIOS after upgrade)
3. Once upgrade is done, reboot into WinPE 1703
4. Run MBR2GPT (supported and recommend method is to run in this version of WinPE)
5. Flip firmware settings (if successful)
6. Reboot to Windows 10 running UEFI
Only one little problem, MBR2GPT was not able to convert the disk (and I even managed to make it crash, but that is another story). After inspecting the disk layout, I noticed that there were 4 partitions (MBR2GPT can only work with 3 or less since it needs to create the EFI partition). After further investigation, it appeared that there were now two Recovery partitions (which seemed a bit odd):

The test system was first built from the following Configuration Manager Windows 7 OSD Task Sequence:

The problem is with the highlighted Partition Disk 0 – BIOS step. Behind the scenes, it creates a diskpart answer file that it uses to partition and format the disk. The Recovery partition is getting set to type 7 instead of type 27 (hidden). When the Windows 10 Setup runs, it does not recognize (or use) the Recovery partition that was created by Configuration Manager and proceeds to create a proper 450 MB hidden Recovery partition after the Windows partition. This is why the system is ending up with four partitions. Even if the Recovery partition that Configuration Manager created was the correct type, it would need to have a certain amount of free space based on its size in order for the Windows 10 Setup to be able to use it (see BIOS/MBR-based hard drive partitions for details on the Recovery tools partition sizes). During the upgrade, what should happen is setup should either resize the existing partition or create a new one if needed (see /ResizeRecoveryPartition switch description from the Windows Setup Command-Line Options). In my testing, it never attempted to resize the partition and always created another Recovery partition after the Windows partition. This is still bad because we end up with 4 partitions and that does not work well for MBR2GPT.

Luckily, there are a few things that can be done to avoid both of these issues. When creating partitions for BIOS based systems, I still like to use the built-in Format and Partition Disk step for creating the System Reserved and the Windows partitions. The reason for this is that I can assign the Windows partition to an OSD variable (which can be useful later on in the Task Sequence). For the Recovery partition, I create this right after the Format and Partition Disk step using a diskpart script in a Package. Now this is what my Format and Partition Disk step looks like for BIOS systems:

On the Windows partition, I now set this to 100% of the remaining space on the disk and notice that OSDisk variable that gets assigned for later use. By leaving this to 99%, this leaves a lot of space for the recovery partition on really large disks when we only need about 499 MB. This Task Sequence step directly after this is a Run Command Line step that calls diskpart with an answer file (with the same conditions as the Format and Partition Disk step).

NOTE: this is statically set to Disk 0 (like the Format and Partition Disk step). If you have systems that the OS disk is showing up on Disk 1, then be sure to create multiple steps with conditions.

After selecting the disk number in my MBR_RecoveryPartition.txt file, the first thing I do is select the Windows partition (#2) and shrink it by 499 MB (to keep within the Recovery Partition parameters). Then simply create a new partition with the remaining space, format it and then set the partition type to 27 (hidden). I list the partition information before and after the commands so that the information gets picked up in the logs and status messages. Using this method, we now have a 499 MB hidden Recovery partition.

Windows 10 In-Place Upgrade

If we just leave this as-is, then chances are the Windows 10 Setup will still create another recovery partition (which is not what we want to happen). Since the previous Windows recovery partition will be replaced, we can create a step right before the Upgrade Operating System step that cleans the Recovery partition. This way, the Windows 10 Setup will use it since there is enough free disk space on that partition (which is exactly what we want so that MBR2GPT will run). This is also Run Command Line step that calls diskpart with an answer file.

NOTE: this is also statically set to Disk 0. If you have systems that the OS disk is showing up on Disk 1, then be sure to create multiple steps with conditions. In addition, only target systems where the third partition is the recovery partition or put a condition on this step that checks for a recovery partition. All data on this partition will be lost after this step executes.

When formatting this partition, the partition type gets reset to 7. The above diskpart script resets the partition type back to 27 (hidden) after the format. Windows 10 Setup will now use the third partition as the recovery partition and after the upgrade there will only be three partitions. This will now allow MBR2GPT to run correctly after the upgrade so that BIOS to UEFI can be done as part of the in-place upgrade to Windows 10.

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/

Upgrading the BIOS Part 2

In Upgrading the BIOS Part 1, I gave some very important reasons why you should be proactive about upgrading the BIOS on supported systems in your environment. In this blog, I want to discuss the approach to flashing the BIOS along with some lessor understood caveats as it relates to BitLocker, BIOS passwords and UEFI 64-bit systems.

Any solution that I create and implement, I like it to be as modular as possible so that I can get maximum use out of it (it is the engineer in me and probably the reason that I still enjoy playing with Legos at my age). When flashing the BIOS, we need to be able to do it under two different operating systems – a full operating system like Windows 7/8.1/10 and a lightweight operating system called WinPE. This will allow us to handle existing clients that are already deployed and also bare metal/break fix scenarios. After all, it would not make much sense to have to boot into a full operating system just to flash the BIOS. Other solutions that I found relied on Configuration Manager Applications and Package/Programs. While these may work for specific scenarios, they cannot cover all scenarios. The Install Application and Install Package task sequence steps only run under a full operating system and not WinPE, so those methods eliminate the bare metal scenarios. Sure, we could create another task sequence or a duplicate package that just does bare metal, but now we have twice as much to manage, update and maintain – no thanks!

Now, there is a slight disclaimer that I need to put out there for the time being. Because of certain limitations with some vendor systems, plus the fact that Configuration Manager can only have one boot image assigned to a task sequence and that you need to use the correct boot image architecture to boot a UEFI system, then you will need to have a separate task sequence to handle the bare metal/break fix scenarios (or better yet, pressure the vendor into supporting 64-bit WinPE). The problem is some vendor models currently only support a 32-bit flash utility. If a system is configured for UEFI (or we are doing BIOS to UEFI in a single task – yes, this is possible now), then you need to use the corresponding boot image architecture. This is going to be 64-bit for modern PC systems (within the last four years or so). Long story short, be sure to check with the vendor of the models that you currently support in order to handle those exceptions (or get rid of them and buy something you can support).

Another important point, both the HP and Lenovo flash BIOS utilities require the WinPE-HTA component to be included in the WinPE boot image. Do not ask me why, I just know that it does not work without it. Just make sure that component is included and things should work just fine. Now Dell, HP and Lenovo do supply 32-bit and 64-bit flash BIOS utilities (with certain models being the exception), so you only need one task sequence if you have these vendors (and supported models). These are the only three vendors that I will be covering, but I will gladly take donated test systems of other vendors you would like me to test.

BIOS Passwords can be tricky. Usually you password protect something in the first place in order to make it secure. However, the flash BIOS utilities will take the password as a command line parameter or in some cases (HP) a bin file. Neither one of these methods are ideal for automation with Configuration Manager. A bin file is downloaded to the cache (or TS working directory) at some point in the process and you do not need the password in order to make changes (including clearing the password) as long as you have the bin file. Command lines get logged and there is nothing like having a password in clear text sitting in a log file. If you would like to see better handling/log file suppression, then head on over to UserVoice and vote up Secret task sequence variable value Exposed. I am not advocating to not use BIOS passwords, you should absolutely be using them in order to lock down settings that should not be changed (like Boot Order). You may have to get clever and write a compiled exe that masks the password(s) in your environment (yes – I know that even this can be cracked depending on how it is done, but at least it is more secure than clear text log files or bin files). Lastly, if dealing with multiple passwords, most of the vendors allow three tries before requiring a reboot and attempting again. If you have multiple passwords in the environment, have a group in the Task Sequence that removes the password before flashing the BIOS. You typically only get one shot specifying a password when flashing the BIOS, so this is a way to overcome this limitation.

When it comes to BitLocker, it will need to be suspended before flashing the BIOS (which is one of the reasons I like using a Task Sequence). If it is not suspended prior, BitLocker will detect a change to the system, and then be prepared to enter the BitLocker recovery key upon restart. It is easy to suspend BitLocker but keep in mind the native Configuration Manager step only suspends BitLocker for one restart. Newer Windows operating systems will allow BitLocker to be suspended for x number of reboots or indefinitely. See my previous blog, called How to detect, suspend, and re-enable BitLocker during a Task Sequence, for more information and examples. For 3rd party disk encryption you are on your own. Your best bet is to contact the vendor on how they support flashing the BIOS. If they do not understand what you are asking, then start seeking alternative disk encryption products (like BitLocker).

So, here are my tips and tricks in a nutshell when flashing the BIOS:

  • Use a task sequence for total control.
  • Incorporate flashing the BIOS into your OSD process for Refresh/In-place Upgrade/New Computer/Break-Fix.
  • Suspend BitLocker!!! (or be prepared to enter the BitLocker recovery key)
  • Disable/re-enable BIOS passwords or use it in the command line of the flash utility (just be careful not to have passwords in clear text in log files or command lines).
  • Dell requires a utility called Flash64w in order to flash in WinPE x64 (see First look – Dell 64-bit Flash BIOS Utility).
  • HP and Lenovo system work on WinPE x64, but requires WinPE-HTA to work.
  • Test, test, test!
  • Baseline and document supported configurations (including how each setting is configured), current BIOS version and release date (this part is key).

In an upcoming blog series, I will be covering off some of my tips and tricks on how to deploy BIOS updates in a modular, dynamic fashion during a Task Sequence (bonus – the same method can be used for drivers as well).

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/

Upgrading the BIOS Part 1

Operating systems and software are not the only thing that needs to be upgraded these days. It is really important that the BIOS firmware gets updated as well. Lately, I have been talking to a lot of IT Pros at conferences and user group meetings and I have discovered that not too many people upgrade or ‘flash’ the BIOS on systems after they have already been deployed (or even ever – sometimes they are sent out with the version they came with from the vendor). It is really important to change this going forward. I recommend developing standard versions that you support so that all systems are running your minimum standard version or newer. Periodically, a review of BIOS releases should be done to see if a later version should become the new minimum standard.

So why even upgrade the BIOS in the first place? There are a few reasons that I can think of that answer this question. The first reason is Windows 10 support. Believe it or not, the hardware vendors test the latest operating systems on the models that they currently support. Take the Lenovo ThinkPad T450, looking in the BIOS release history, you can see that Windows 10 support was added for version 1.17:

<1.17> 2015/09/07
– (New) Added win10 support.
– (New) Enabled N25Q128 SPI ROM support.
– (New) Added security fix addresses LEN-2015-002 SMM “Incursion” Attack.
– (New) Included security fixies.
– (New) Added new incompatibility bit for Back Flash Prevention.

Now this does not mean that Windows 10 will not work on versions lower than version 1.17. It means that this is probably the version that they validated and tested Windows 10 against. If you happen to run into an issue running Windows 10 on a version lower than 1.17 and you call in for support, chances are they will have you upgrade the BIOS to the latest version to see if that addresses your issue.

The second reason to upgrade the BIOS is to get fixes. It makes sense to start off on one of the latest releases than it does to start off with a version that is a year or more behind in fixes. By not upgrading to a recent version as part of the deployment process, you are potentially wasting everyone’s time – the end user, help desk, desk side (and your time if the problem comes back to you). Save the hassle and be proactive. Looking at a newer BIOS release version for the same Lenovo ThinkPad T450, we see that there is even a ‘SCCM’ fix listed in version 1.19:

<1.19>
– (New) Updated verbtable for noise.
– (New) Changed Haswell + N16s Tolud.
– (New) Updated Winuptp & Winuptp64.
– (Fix) Fixed an issue that srsetupwin fails to install pop/hdp with clearing SVP.
– (Fix) Fixed an issue related to SCCM 80070490 error when HDP is set.
– (Fix) Fixed an issue related to silent install auto restart issue.

The third reason to upgrade the BIOS is to get security related fixes. Yes, they find and fix security fixes in the BIOS firmware just like they do in operating systems and software. Do your security team (and yourself) a favor and deploy versions that contain these security fixes. Looking at the BIOS release history for the HP EliteBook Folio 9470m, we can see some of these security fixes listed in this version:

Version:F.60 A (20 Jan 2015)
Fixes
– Fixes an intermittent issue where enabling the LAN/WLAN switching feature in the F10 BIOS settings causes the system to stop functioning properly (hang) at POST after a warm boot.

Enhancements
– Provides improved security of UEFI code and variables. HP strongly recommends transitioning promptly to this updated BIOS version which supersedes all previous releases.

NOTE: Due to security changes, after this BIOS update is installed, previous versions cannot be reinstalled.

Pay close attention to the note at the end of the release text – it states that previous versions cannot be reinstalled. What this means is that you can no longer ‘flash’ back to an earlier BIOS version. This is important when it comes to deploying BIOS and how we detect what systems need to be updated, but more on that later.

The fourth reason that comes to mind is has to do with manipulating the BIOS settings programmatically. I have written blogs and talked on the topic of using the vendor utilities to programmatically change the BIOS settings (like BIOS to UEFI) using a Configuration Manager task sequence. Just as it is important to standardize on the BIOS versions, you should also develop standards on how each BIOS setting should be configured in order to maintain consistency and ensure devices are configured accordingly. By running on the latest BIOS version, you will ensure that these utilities will work correctly and configure the settings correctly.

I am sure I can think of many more reasons why you should start baselining and upgrading the BIOS versions for the supported systems in your environment, but hopefully I have identified the top four reasons and have convinced you that this needs to be done on a regular basis. In the next blog, Upgrading the BIOS Part 2, I will discuss the approach to flashing the BIOS along with some lessor understood caveats as it relates to BitLocker, BIOS passwords and UEFI 64-bit systems.

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/

BIOS and Secure Boot State Detection during a Task Sequence Part 2

In BIOS and Secure Boot State Detection Part 1, I talked about the various states a system can be in for the BIOS Mode and Secure Boot state. Having these states defined as OSD variables can be useful in determining what actions need to be performed in order to switch a system to UEFI Native with Secure Boot enabled. Depending on how you perform the vendor firmware changes, you may or may not need to define the difference between UEFI Hybrid and UEFI Native. UEFI Hybrid is when the system is running UEFI and the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) is enabled (this is how you can run Windows 7 in UEFI mode – yes, really). In order to enable Secure Boot, the CSM needs to be disabled first. Also, for Secure Boot state, you may or may not need to define all of the possible options. If the goal is to get to Secure Boot enabled, that may be good enough to just test for that. However, Secure Boot disabled may be a nice to have in the case you have systems that do not play well with Secure Boot being enabled.

I start off by creating a group called Set BIOS and Secure Boot Variables. For a Windows 10 In-place Upgrade Task Sequence, I place this group after the Install Updates step in the Post-Processing group (but more on that in another post). This way, the system is already running Windows 10, which is a Secure Boot capable operating system (unlike Windows 7, which is not capable of running Secure Boot). The first Task Sequence variable I like to define is called BIOSMode, I set this to LegacyBIOS on the condition that _SMSTSBootUEFI equals FALSE.

imageimage

We could just use the _SMSTSBootUEFI variable, however it is not as intuitive to other administrators if they need to read or edit the Task Sequence or read Status Messages and/or log files.

Next, add another Task Sequence variable called SecureBootState with the value Enabled. The condition on this is going to be based on the registry value:  HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\State\UEFISecureBootEnabled = 1.

image

image

Now add another Set Task Sequence variable step with the same name, SecureBootState, but this time set the value to Disabled. The condition on this is going to be based on the registry value:  HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot\State\UEFISecureBootEnabled = 0.

image

image

There is also the Secure Boot state of unknown or NA, but for the time being I do not use this one in any of my Task Sequences. I also do not use the condition where SecureBootState = Disabled currently, but I figured it would be handy to have it in the future if needed. I have also created an item on uservoice so that maybe one day we will see a variable like this as part of the product: Create an OSD variable for Secure Boot – _SMSTSSecureBootState.

Feel free to download my exported Set BIOS and Secure Boot Variables Task Sequence here (created on Configuration Manager Current Branch 1702). Stay tuned on how to use these variables in a BIOS to UEFI Task Sequence…

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/

BIOS and Secure Boot State Detection during a Task Sequence Part 1

With all of the security issues and malware lately, BIOS to UEFI for Windows 10 deployments is becoming a pretty hot topic (unless you have been living under a rock, UEFI is required for a lot of the advanced security functions in Windows 10). In addition, with the Windows 10 Creators Update, Microsoft has introduced a new utility called MBR2GPT that makes the move to UEFI a non-destructive process. If you have already started deploying Windows 10 UEFI devices, it can be tricky to determine what state these devices are in during a running Task Sequence. The Configuration Manager Team introduced a new class called SMS_Firmware and inventory property called UEFI that helps determine which computers are running in UEFI in Current Branch 1702. This can be used to build queries for targeting and reports, but it would be nice to handle this plus Secure Boot state (and CSM) during a running Task Sequence. We do have the Task Sequence variable called _SMSTSBootUEFI that we will use, but we need to determine the exact configuration in order to execute the correct steps.

There are three different BIOS modes that a system can be running:
Legacy BIOS – also known as BIOS emulation, this requires a MBR partitioned disk in order to boot. Most Windows 7 systems are running this configuration.
UEFI Hybrid – this mode is when a system is running in UEFI, but with the Compatibility Support Module (CSM) (also known as Legacy ROMs) enabled. Unlike Legacy BIOS, this mode requires a GPT partitioned disk in order to boot. Windows 7 can run in this configuration and before there was MBR2GPT, this was the recommended mode to deploy Windows 7 in so that it could be easily upgraded to Windows 10 at a later date without repartitioning the disk.
UEFI Native – this mode is when a system is running in UEFI without the CSM. It also requires a GPT partitioned disk in order to boot. Windows 7 cannot run on a system that is configured for UEFI Native.

Now let’s talk about Secure Boot. Secure Boot and CSM are incompatible – if the CSM is enabled, then you cannot enable Secure Boot. When Secure Boot is enabled, you cannot enable the CSM. Based on this information, we know that Secure Boot will be unsupported in Legacy BIOS and UEFI Hybrid modes (Note: When I say unsupported, I am not talking about if the device is capable of running Secure Boot. Secure Boot requires a device running UEFI 2.3.1 Errata C or later and an operating system capable of running Secure Boot). Configuration Manager currently does not have out of the box functionality for reporting on Secure Boot, but the feature has showed up in the Technical Preview 1703 release. In the meantime, see my blog called Inventory Secure Boot State and UEFI with ConfigMgr on how to extend hardware inventory in Current Branch 1702 or older in order to collect this information.

From this information, we can create a handy chart to help visualize the configuration options:

NOTE: For UEFI Hybrid, Secure Boot State is unsupported if the CSM is enabled, however, an operating system that supports Secure Boot will show that status as Off (Disabled) in System Information.

Now, with this information and MBR2GPT, we should be able to create a single Windows 10 Feature Update Task Sequence for clients Windows 7/8/8.1/10 and it should not matter if they are already running UEFI or Legacy BIOS. The actions that we need to perform do matter and this is where we can set some Task Sequence variables to help with the logic on the various steps. But first, let’s see what needs to be done based on the four configurations above. We already said that Legacy BIOS is the only configuration that uses a MBR partitioned disk. Therefore, this will be the only configuration that we need to run MBR2GPT. When we run MBR2GPT, we also need to configure the device’s firmware settings for UEFI and enable Secure Boot (the Microsoft solution does not do this for you, you are on your own to use the vendor methods to do this piece).

If you are one of the few that took last year’s recommendation and started deploying Windows 7 in UEFI mode, then those systems will be running UEFI Hybrid. We do not need to run MBR2GPT on these systems since they are already running a GPT partitioned disk. We simply need to turn off the CSM (or Legacy ROMs) and enable Secure Boot (once again, the Microsoft solution does not do this for you).

For systems that are running UEFI Native but Secure Boot is not enabled, we simply need to enable Secure Boot. Lastly, for systems that are already running UEFI Native with Secure Boot enabled, we do not need to do anything additional for these systems. Adding these actions to our chart, it makes it very clear what actions need to be done under each scenario:

In a follow blog post, I will go into more detail on how we can use this logic in a single Windows 10 In-Place Upgrade Task Sequence, what the steps look like and where each of them go.

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/

How to detect, suspend, and re-enable BitLocker during a Task Sequence

In this blog post, I am going to show some simple steps that you can add to your Task Sequences to be able to detect, disable, and enable BitLocker status. This can be useful (and necessary) when performing activities like flashing the BIOS, running the new MBR2GPT utility, or upgrading to a newer version of Windows. In Configuration Manager, there are a few Task Sequence steps that are for BitLocker configuration and management:

Disable BitLocker – this step will disable BitLocker encryption on the current operating system drive or one that you specify and runs in a full operating system (does not run in WinPE). It does not decrypt the drive, but it does leave the key protectors visible in clear text on the hard drive. This step only disables BitLocker for one reboot (if you would like to see this step updated, vote for my Configuration Manager Uservoice item Add Reboot Count functionality to the Disable BitLocker TS Step). This means that BitLocker will be enabled again after the restart. If you need BitLocker to be disabled for more than one restart, then you can use manage-bde with a Run Command Line step (see below). Also, if there are data drives encrypted, then they need to be disabled before disabling the operating system drive.

Note: before running MBR2GPT, BitLocker should be disabled. Also, for just a Windows 10 In-place Upgrade with BitLocker (not doing MBR2GPT), it is not required to disable BitLocker, however, there have been reports of BitLocker not being suspended long enough during the upgrade (see the link to Jonathan Conway’s blog below) .

Enable BitLocker – this step will enable BitLocker encryption on a drive. It only runs in a full operating system (in other words, it does not run in WinPE). If selected for use, the TPM must already be enabled, activated, and allow ownership prior to running this step. This step can be used to re-enable BitLocker if the drive is already encrypted with BitLocker but in a disabled state.

Pre-provision BitLocker – this step runs under WinPE (only) and is used to enable BitLocker during the WinPE phase of the Task Sequence. It also encrypts the used drive space, which makes encryption times faster. Once in the full operating system, use the Enable BitLocker step to apply the key management options. This step is generally be used in New Computer or Wipe-and-Load Task Sequences.

Manage-bde – this is a built in command line tool that allows for the enabling, disabling, updating and reporting on BitLocker. The Microsoft TechNet documentation on Manage-bde is a bit stale and has not been updated to reflect some of the new capabilities that have been added in the newer releases. The most important one is the ability to control the reboot count when the protectors have been suspended. There is a new parameter called -RebootCount or -rc that takes a value between 0 and 15, where 0 suspends the protection indefinitely. This can be useful if you have several reboots during a Task Sequence and you need to make sure that BitLocker stays suspended (optional method listed below).

Note: Jonathan Conway has a great blog on how to use Manage-bde with the Task Sequence called SCCM Windows 10 Upgrade Task Sequence: BitLocker PIN Protector Issues on Laptops.

Now, to disable BitLocker, you could place that step in the Task Sequence and allow it to ‘Continue on error’. If you like to only use ‘Continue on error’ in certain cases and definitely want to know if BitLocker was enabled (so that you can conditionally re-enable it later on in the Task Sequence), then this can easily be done with a Set Task Sequence Variable step. Create a new Group called Disable BitLocker and on the Options tab add the following:
Task Sequence Variable _SMSTSinWinPE equals “False”

Place a Set Task Sequence Variable step in the Disable BitLocker Group and call it Set OSDBitLockerStatus for the name. Enter OSDBitLockerStatus for the Task Sequence Variable and enter Protected for the Value.
On the Options tab, add the following:
WMI Namespace: root\cimv2\Security\MicrosoftVolumeEncryption
WMI Query: select * from win32_encryptablevolume where driveletter = ‘c:’ and protectionstatus = ‘1’

This will check the BitLocker status on the C: drive (which is hopefully the OS drive). Keep in mind that if there are other data volumes that are BitLocker encrypted, these will need to be detected and decrypted first. Those systems can be filtered out in the collection targeting or it can be built into the Task Sequence using the same logic as above.

Next, add a Disable BitLocker step (with the option set Current operating system drive).
On the Options tab, add the following:
Task Sequence Variable OSDBitLockerStatus equals “Protected”

Optionally (recommended if needing multiple reboots), instead of using the built in Disable BitLocker step, add a Run Command Line step:
Name: Disable BitLocker
Command line: manage-bde -protectors -disable C: -RC 0
On the Options tab, add the following:
Task Sequence Variable OSDBitLockerStatus equals “Protected”

 

To re-enable BitLocker later on in the Task Sequence, create another group called Re-enable BitLocker.
On the Options tab, add the following:
Task Sequence Variable _SMSTSinWinPE equals “False”
Task Sequence Variable OSDBitLockerStatus equals “Protected”

Next, add an Enable BitLocker step under the Re-enable BitLocker Group (with the option set Current operating system drive). Since the drive is already encrypted, this step will just re-enable the key protectors if they are currently disabled (like if you used managed-bde and specified a reboot count).

Remember that the built in Disable BitLocker step will only disable BitLocker for one reboot (similar to what happens when you suspend BitLocker from the Control Panel applet), but if you used manage-bde with -RC 0, you will need to re-enable BitLocker.

Keep this Task Sequence template handy so that you can easily copy and paste into other Task Sequences in the future. I will be referring to this template in upcoming blog posts.

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/

First look – Dell 64-bit Flash BIOS Utility

Dell Laptop

Update 2/14/2017: Dell has publicly posted a download link to the 64-bit BIOS Installation Utility (now called Flash64W.exe) and you can find it here: http://en.community.dell.com/techcenter/enterprise-client/w/wiki/12237.64-bit-bios-installation-utility

Now that the cat is out of the bag that Dell has a 64-bit Flash BIOS Utility, I can finally blog about it. Earlier this week, Warren Byle of Dell announced the following on Twitter:

So there you have it, the wait is over (of course, after you get off the phone with Dell support) and you can now flash the Dell BIOS in 64-bit. You are probably thinking ‘big deal, I could do that already – flash the BIOS on 64-bit Windows 10’. Yea, you are right since full 64-bit Windows has a 32-bit subsystem, but the real magic is being able to flash the BIOS under WinPE. If your system is running UEFI (or you have a UEFI conversion Task Sequence), then it needs to boot the native architecture (in this case 64-bit). By only having a 32-bit flash BIOS utility before meant that we were unable to flash under WinPE x64. The Dell 64-bit Flash BIOS Utility is a much welcome (and needed) addition to the IT toolbox (thanks Warren)!

Using the tool is pretty simple, you use it in addition to the BIOS exe that you have already downloaded. I’ll cover off how I use it in a Configuration Manager Package in another post, but for now, here is how you use it:

001-flashupdatewin64

I used the following command line under WinPE x64 to silently flash a Dell OptiPlex 7040 from version 1.4.5 to 1.5.4:

FlashUpDateWin64.exe /b=OptiPlex_7040_1.5.4.exe /s /f /l=1.5.4.txt

Which wrote the following output:

***BIOS flash started on 1/31/2017 at 18:38:32***
Command: F:\FlashUpDateWin64.exe /b=OptiPlex_7040_1.5.4.exe /s /f /l=1.5.4.txt

1.4.5 INSTALLED (Dell System OptiPlex 7040)
– Gigabit Ethernet : 0.8
– Intel Management Engine (VPro) Update : 11.0.18.1002
– System BIOS with BIOS Guard  : 1.4.5
1.5.4 UPDATE ( OptiPlex 7040)
– System BIOS with BIOS Guard  : 1.5.4
– Gigabit Ethernet : 0.8
– Intel Management Engine (VPro) Update : 11.0.18.1002
– System Map : 1.0.1
– PCR0 XML : 0.0.0.1

Exit Code = 2 (Reboot Required)
***BIOS flash finished at 1/31/2017 at 18:38:41***

I hope you are as excited as me about this new *SHINY* utility from Dell. Happy 64-bit BIOS flashing!

Originally posted on https://miketerrill.net/